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CONSTITUTIONAL LA W-RELAnoN OF FEDERAL AND STATE Gov-
ERNMENTS-APPLICABILITY OF STATE MINIMUM PRICE REGULATIONS TO 
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT-The United States accepted the lowest bids for 
the supply of milk at three military installations in California. Because these 
bids were below the minimum prices for wholesale milk prescribed by state 
law,1 California instituted proceedings in the state courts for civil damages 
and injunctive relief against the successful bidders. The United States 
brought a separate action in a federal district court asking that the state be 
enjoined from applying its minimum price regulations to milk purchases by 
the armed services on the grounds that the military installations were 
federal enclaves over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction and 
that the state regulatory scheme burdened the United States in the exercise 
of its powers to maintain the armed forces and to regulate federal territory.2 
The three-judge district court granted the injunction on a motion for sum-
mary judgment.3 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, 
1 CAL, AGRIC, CODE § 4350. 
2 United States v. Warne, 190 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Cal. 1960). 
s A three-judge district court is required whenever a party seeks to enjoin a state statute 
on the grounds of its unconstitutionality. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958). Appeal may be taken 
directly to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying the injunction. 28 
U.S.C. § 1253 (1958). See Florida Lime & Avacado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 
(1960); The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. REv. 81, 137-39 (1960). 
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affirmed in part and in part vacated and remanded,4 three Justices dissent-
ing.5 The application of state minimum price regulations to purchases by 
the armed services out of appropriated funds is inconsistent with the 
federal military-procurement policy. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 
(1963). 
The statutes on which the Court chiefly relied in the principal case speak 
in terms of competitive bidding to assure the government of the lowest pos-
sible price.6 Competitive bidding is not always required, however, and 
contracts may be negotiated under a number of circumstances, one of which 
arises when it is "impracticable to obtain competition."7 An argument, 
based upon this provision, can be made that Congress intended to accom-
modate federal procurement to valid state price and rate regulations. How-
ever, the Armed Services Procurement Regulations8 do not relax the basic 
requirement of competition to secure the lowest price for the government, 
even when the contract is negotiated.9 Nor do the regulations provide for 
negotiation when rates or prices are fixed by state law. The Court felt that 
the Armed Services Procurement Act and the associated regulations mani-
fested a federal policy of competition-with no exception for state price 
and rate regulatjons. Thus state regulations which effectively eliminate 
price competition are in conflict with federal policy. 
The approach of the Court in the principal case is markedly different 
from that taken in Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n,10 which dealt 
with similar facts. In the latter case Pennsylvania refused to renew the 
4 The Court found that the federal procurement policy applied only to the purchases 
made with appropriated funds and not to the purchases made with nonappropriated funds 
for use in military clubs and for resale at post exchanges. As to the latter purchases, the 
judgment was vacated and the case remanded to determine whether such transactions 
were exempt from state regulations as sales tal<lng place on federal enclaves within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Department of 
Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285 (1943). If the basic state law concerning minimum milk prices 
antedated the acquisition of the installations by the United States, current price controls 
are applicable to sales on these installations. See James Stewart&: Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 
94 (1940). If the basic law did not antedate the acquisition, it must still be determined 
whether these tracts are federal enclaves and whether the sales took place on the enclave. 
See generally Laurent, Federal Areas Within the Exterior Boundaries of the States, 17 
TENN. L. REv. 328 (1942); Pillsbury, Law Applicable to National Parks and Other Federal 
Reservations Within a State, 22 CALIF. L. REv. 152 (1934). 
5 Mr. Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion, agreed that Congress could immunize 
federal procurement from state minimum price laws. However, after examining the history 
of the legislation in question, he concluded that Congress had not done so, but instead 
had intended federal procurement to be accommodated to valid state rate and price regula-
tions of general applicability. Principal case at 270. 
6 Armed Services Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2305(a) (1958) states: "The specifica• 
tions and invitations for bids shall permit such free and full competition as is consistent 
with the procurement of the property and services needed by the agency concerned." 
7 Armed Services Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(IO) (1958). 
s Heads of departments are authorized to promulgate regulations, not inconsistent with 
law, respecting, among other things, the distribution and performance of the depart• 
ment's business. REv. STAT. § 161 (1875), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958). 
9 32 C.F.R. § 1.300-1 (1961); 32 C.F.R. § 3.101 (1961). 
10 318 U.S. 261 (1943). 
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license of a contractor who sold milk to the federal government at a price 
below the state minimum. The Court, in allowing the imposition of state 
minimum price regulations, exhibited a deferential attitude toward state 
regulations and indicated that an unambiguous congressional purpose 
would be necessary to set aside otherwise valid state regulations.11 The 
principal case shows a sharp change of attitude in the present Court. Al-
though the present statute is substantially the same as that involved in the 
Penn Dairies decision,12 the Court nevertheless struck down the state mini-
mum price regulations because Congress failed to except them explicitly 
from its provisions. The Penn Dairies case was not overruled; rather, it was 
distinguished on narrow grounds.13 
This change in attitude first became apparent in Public Util. Comm'n 
v. United States.14 In that case the Court invalidated a state scheme of 
regulated rates as applied to the federal government and its contractors. 
The state regulatory policy was deemed to be inconsistent with the federal 
policy of negotiated rates, embodied in statutes analogous to those in Penn 
Dairies. However, in addition to the above mentioned policy conflict, the 
state transportation regulations, because of their nature, were susceptible 
to invalidation as an impingement on the execution of federal functions.15 
Thus the federal policy of competition may not have been in itself sufficient 
to override the state regulations.1° 
In the absence of legislation, the federal government enjoys an implied 
immunity from both regulatory and revenue producing statutes.17 The 
policy that the federal government should be free from interference by the 
states in the execution of federal functions underlies this immunity.18 There 
11 In Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261 (1943), the Court 
stated at 275: "An unexpressed purpose of Congress to set aside statutes of the states regu-
lating their internal affairs is not lightly to be inferred and ought not to be implied where 
the legislative command read in the light of its history, remains ambiguous. . • • [W]e 
should be slow to strike down legislation which the state concededly had power to enact, 
because of its asserted burden on the federal government.'' 
12 It is significant that the dissenting opinion in Penn Dairies, written by Mr. Justice 
Douglas, took the same view of the federal statutes and regulations then in effect as the 
majority opinion in the principal case, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, took of the federal 
statutes and regulations now in effect. Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, supra 
note 11, at 281 (dissenting opinion). 
13 The distinction was that the regulations in effect when the Penn Dairies suit was 
begun stated that purchases could be made in the open market, where price was fixed by 
law or regulation. However, the Court in Penn Dairies suggested that this regulation was 
not determinative. (The regulation had been eliminated before the appeal to the Supreme 
Court.) Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, supra note 11, at 278. 
14 355 U.S. 534 (1958). 
115 See Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARv. L. R.Ev. 77, 161-64 (1958). 
10 In United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285 (1963), which came 
down the same day as the principal case, the Court held that Georgia rate regulations 
could not be enforced against government contractors transporting the personal effects of 
civilian employees of the federal government. 
17 This doctrine originated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4- Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
18 In McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 17, the Court said at 4-36: "[T]he States have 
no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control 
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is little doubt that direct state regulation of the operations of the federal 
government would be readily invalidated.19 On the other hand, in the ab-
sence of conflicting federal regulations, the states may impose safety and 
other regulations on one doing business for the federal government.20 How-
ever, where the regulation interferes with the effective discharge of federal 
£unctions, it is unconstitutional regardless of whether the object sought to 
be regulated is the federal government or merely a government contractor.21 
Thus, where such a statute is attacked as unconstitutionally applied to a 
private person in the service of the government, the Court must examine 
the degree to which the regulation burdens the government. In the princi-
pal case, the issue was squarely before the Court, but was not discussed. 
Neither the federal statutes22 nor the federal regulations28 involved in this 
case applied to the purchases made with nonappropriated funds. The case 
was remanded to determine whether these sales were immune as taking 
place in federal enclaves within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States.24 Therefore, at least implicitly, the Court recognized that the state 
regulations are not an unconstitutional burden on the federal government,25 
in the absence of legislative policy to the contrary. This is reasonable, since 
there is very little actual interference with the operations of the federal 
government. The state regulations in no way impair the ability of the 
federal government to select contractors, or determine terms of contract 
other than price. Nor do they subject the federal government to the adminis-
trative procedures of the state. The only burden on the government is 
economic, and that alone has been declared to be insufficient to invalidate 
state legislation.2 0 
The states clearly have the power to regulate milk prices,27 and their 
interest in maintaining such regulations is quite strong. The Supreme 
Court, by excluding the federal government from the operation of this 
legislation, has to some extent undermined the efficacy of the state system of 
the operation of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the 
powers vested in the general government." 
19 See Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 
(1931); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920). Taxation cases may generally be resolved 
by determining who bears the legal incidence of the tax. Compare Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. 
Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954), with Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941). 
20 See James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Armed Services Procurement Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2303 (1958). 
2s 32 C.F.R. § 1.102 (Supp. 1963). 
24 See note 4 supra. 
25 On this point, the principal case and Penn Dairies are perfectly reconcilable. Penn 
Dairies held that the Pennsylvania milk regulations did not violate the federal govern-
ment's implied immunity. Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 278 
(1943). 
26 See Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 
302 U .s. 134 (1937). 
27 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
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regulation.28 The sole basis of the decision is a federal policy favoring com-
petition; such a policy no doubt exists. However, Congress did not clearly 
intend to override state minimum price laws in the pursuit of competition. 
Nor are the regulations perfectly clear, since it appears that a procurement 
officer could readily accept the state's minimum prices without violating 
any provision of the regulations. The only definitive statement of federal 
policy came from the official who rejected the bids submitted at the state 
minimum price. This, it seems, amounts to far less than the inflexible con-
gressional purpose that the Court in Penn Dairies would have required to 
set aside the state regulations. Thus, by enjoining the state from enforce-
ment of its price regulations, the Court has discarded the cautious approach 
of Penn Dairies. However, no language in this opinion can be regarded as 
broadening the implied immunity of the federal government. If, in this 
case, the Court has done an injustice to congressional intent, the door 
remains open for Congress to make its meaning more explicit. 
Alexander E. Bennett 
28 Tl1e theory of minimum milk price regulation is that it fosters safety in production, 
curbs unfair practices, and assures a steady source of supply. To what extent these ob-
jectives are frustrated by the decision in the principal case is open to question, since the 
price is regulated on other market levels, the federal government is an intelligent buyer, 
and specific state legislation is ainled at safety and trade practices. 
